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Abstract
This article tackles the issue of the separation between 
the Jordanian and Palestinian national identities as stated 
by a group of Jordanian retired military servicemen 
who named themselves “the National Committee of 
Retired Army Veterans”. This group has introduced to 
the Jordanian public a radical conservative discourse that 
denounces the in-ground reality that Jordan has become 
an alternative homeland for Palestinian refugees; so the 
nationality rights of Jordanians of Palestinian origin shall 
be removed to support their return to the West Bank. 
Following a historical approach to discourse analysis, the 
article studies the distribution of a set of topoi, themes or 
motifs, which are approached by the frequent reference 
to Jordanian national identity. The discussion is based 
on a qualitative analysis of a corpus of 29 statement by 
the Committee and the contexts in which the keywords 
identity, agenda, naturalization, settlement, quotas, 
disengagement, and the alternative homeland occur. The 
article concludes that the Committee’s radical conservative 
discourse is mostly based by foregrounding the topoi of 
threat, conspiracy, and their role as a guardian of national 
identity.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early spring 2010, the public opinion in Jordan was 
traumatized by a statement issued by a group of Jordanian 
retired veterans with the name “the National Committee 
of Retired Army Veterans”. In this first of several 
statements, the “Committee” exhorted the government to 
“constitutionalize” the regulations (“ta3leemat”) of the 
1988 Resolution of the Disengagement of Jordan’s from 
the West Bank and put them in law (Retired Army, 2010). 
Alongside, the Committee demanded that all Palestinians 
in Jordan be denied and stripped of the full Jordanian 
citizenship acquired when the Kingdom annexed the West 
Bank after the Six-Days War in 1967. For those who are 
“unable to return” to Palestine, the statement declares 
that they remain “Jordanians until the implementation of 
the UN Resolution no. 194 which calls for their return 
to their homes”.1 This scheme is the highlight of a long 
manifesto that aims, according to its writers, to warn 
against the never-ending Zionist’s scheme for liquidating 
the Palestinian problem at the expense of Jordan (Lukacs, 
2000,  p.316). 
The National Committee of Retired Army Veterans 
(henceforth NCRAV) was not the first voice to warn 
against the scheme of “the Jordanian solution” for 
the problem of the Palestinian refugees (“laje’een”). 
The different events which hit the region since the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 have always 
resulted in commotions which afflicted Jordan. The flux 
of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank cross the 
River Jordan to the East Bank has drastically affected 
1 The Resolution dictates that “refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to 
do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should 
be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss 
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law 
or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible.”
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the demographic fabric of the Jordanian state. In the 
following decades, the number of Palestinians in Jordan 
has dramatically increased to reach about 4.5 million 
(Minority Rights Group International, 2008). Half of 
them, at least, are naturalised and permanently settled in 
the East Bank (Jordan) with no remaining administrative 
ties to Palestine. The second half, especially those who 
came to Jordan on the aftermath of the Six Days War in 
1967, are considered “displaced refugees” (“nazeHeen”) 
with Jordanian citizenship and provided with Yellow 
Identity Cards to point to the fact that they possess an 
Israeli residence permit to entitle them to return to the 
West Bank. The rest involves about quarter of a million 
refugees without Jordanian citizenship. They were 
categorized into two categories, those who are issued 
with a Green Identity Card to indicate their origins in 
the West Bank, and those who are issued a Blue Identity 
Card to indicate their origins in Gaza strip (Human 
Rights Watch, 2010). However, the most recent forms 
of international pressure push towards more concrete 
Jordanian solution. This is mostly manifested via the 
strategic diplomatic initiatives which aim to the abortion 
of the idea of an independent Palestinian state in favour 
of a resolution of comprehensive and permanent peace. 
In addition, the continuous tangible pressure on the 
inhabitants of the West Bank pushes to their forced 
migration to Jordan. What arouses the concerns of the 
NCRAV most is the emergence of an organized and 
politically motivated campaign of propaganda that 
aims at establishing a consociational political system in 
Jordan. This system will inevitably lead to the settlement 
of more Palestinian refugees in Jordan until establishing 
them as a demographic majority. Then, the Jordanian 
state will be facing concentrated pressure to naturalise 
(“tajnis”) all Palestinians settled within its borders. This 
scheme is understood and propagated by the NCRAV as 
an existential threat to the Jordanian national identity as it 
would in effect put into action the scheme of establishing 
an alternative Palestinian homeland in the East Bank 
and the dissolve of the Jordanian state and its distinctive 
identity (Mahdi, 1997). And this is plainly materialised, 
according to the NCRAV, by the coming out of a tapered 
monopoly within the circles of decision making in Jordan 
that works on preventing the Jordanian people from 
determining their own fate and defending Jordan and its 
supreme national interests. Consequently, the NCRAV 
sees that Jordan disengagement from the West Bank 
in 1988 was a decisive turning point for maintaining 
Jordan’s national identity; and it is vital for the political 
system to implement this resolution by ending all legal 
and administrative aspects of Jordan’s unification with 
the West Bank by bestowing constitutional legitimate 
status on this decision. By such radical measures, among 
a few other ones aiming to promote political reform 
and development, the NCRAV argues that the “pride of 
Jordanian national identity” will be restored.
My primary analytical focus in this article is the 
development of such radically conservative (right-wing) 
mainstream in Jordan as presented by the retired army 
veterans. I argue here that the discourse of the retired 
army veterans on Jordanian identity can be linguistically 
located within the discourse on national identity within 
the span of “right-wing” genre. Herein, the critical 
linguistic study of the discourse of the NCRAV on the 
socio-political situation in Jordan reveals the thematic 
topoi (traditional themes or motifs) of such “radicalist” 
and “conservativist” genre. The linguistic analysis here is 
based on the gathering of a small corpus of 29 statements 
by the NCRAV issued in the last five years. I present 
representative exemplary extracts from the corpus for 
the critical linguistic analysis. These exemplar extracts 
are characterised by the salience of “Jordanian identity” 
theme, and they can be regarded as exemplary of “right-
wing” genre. In addition, these extracts echo the epochal 
distinctiveness of the current socio-political situation of 
Jordan as they emerged at critical stages and historical 
turns. These events, and the discourse formed by them, 
have, directly or indirectly, contributed to make significant 
changes in reshaping the understanding of the nature of 
political discourse in Jordan; especially that of national 
identity.
1.  TOPOI OF JORDAN’S RADICAL AND 
CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISM
Jordan has been witnessing a tidal wave of conservative 
and radical nationalism since Hamas (aka Islamic 
Resistance Movement) won the Palestinian legislative 
elections on 25 January 2006 (Terrill, 2010, p.96). Since 
then, the conservative and radical nationalism in Jordan 
has urged the embracing of a discourse on more local 
politics and economy, and less foreign relations under 
the slogan “Jordan First” (Al-Oudat & Alshboul, 2010). 
Although this discourse did not go at the beginning further 
than the mere rhetoric of catchphrases and slogans, the 
echo of this discourse triggers fears from the initiation 
of actual political practices in the long run. However, in 
many occasions, such a discourse has overwhelmingly 
linked rhetoric to social practices. Addressing their 
supporters and their rivals, pro-nationalism developed 
a consistent conservative discourse that represents their 
self-image and radical ideological stance. The aim of 
this stance is to envisage their radical vision on the 
distribution of power and authority within the Jordanian 
society between the pro-nationalism and their supporters; 
and marginalizing their rivals and critics; especially if 
those later ones are not affiliated to pure “aborigine” 
Trans-Jordanian tribes (The Economist, 2014). Thus, for 
radical pro-nationalism, national identity has primacy over 
citizenship; and, citizens who are not aborigine Trans-
Jordanians, especially of Palestinian origin, are accepted 
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as part of the national community as long as they suppress 
all signs of non-Jordanian, especially Palestinian, identity 
(Nanes, 2008, p.86). Jordanian nationalists, then, are 
defined and redefined continuously through their verbal 
actions and social practices which aim to consolidate their 
position on the ground and gain legitimacy and potential 
popularity. This objective is introduced to the public 
by means of the pro-nationalism’s self-identification 
and self constitution strategies which are presented by 
communicative actions. 
Conservative nationalism mainstream is a complex 
and multifaceted phenomenon in Jordan, and it stretches 
back to the early twentieth century, and in the aftermaths 
of the Great Arab Revolt in 1916 CE. For decades, this 
mainstream is produced and practiced by the Jordanian 
bureaucracy, its machinery and propaganda, its allies in 
public and civil society institutions and media, and to a 
large extent, the Jordanian people themselves (Anderson, 
2009). The earliest versions of this mainstream produced 
a discourse that was intrinsically nationalist in its concern 
of restoring and establishing and consolidating the long-
rooted Arabic heritage of the states liberated from the 
Ottomans. In the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War in 
1948, Jordanian nationalism oriented its concern towards 
the anti-Zionist sentiment which defies the establishment 
of a Zionist state in Palestine at the expense of Jordan. 
This nationalist sentiment has been predominantly 
concerned also with the authority and sovereignty of 
the Hashemite rule. Its early discourse accentuated the 
necessity of protecting the internal front from disorder 
and external conspiracies associated with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Such anti-conspiracy discourse has intensified 
despite the absence of substantial colonial or imperialist 
elements which trigger the traditional iterations of 
nationalism. This conservative discourse encouraged the 
reestablishment of the paternalistic authoritarian practices 
by the state for the sake of finding a fair and permanent 
solution to the conflict. This wave of nationalism then 
gave way for a more sustainable and prominent, anti-
occupation and anti-Israel, Pan Arabism discourse that 
supported the rights of Palestinians in Jordan to return to 
their homeland (Sela, 2002, pp.160-166, “Arab Unity”).
Jordanian nationalism has witnessed a drastic turn 
by the Late King Hussein’s declaration of Jordan’s 
administrative and political disengagement (“fak al-
’irTebaat”) from the West Bank on 31 July 1988. This 
step has been considered a breakup with a binding 
relationship that unified and assimilated both the 
Jordanian and Palestinian identities after the annex of the 
West Bank territories to the Hashemite Kingdom in 1950. 
Furthermore, this decision freed Jordan from the historical 
responsibilities as a representative of the Palestinians 
in the occupied lands and the exile to the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO). Since then, Jordanian 
nationalism abandoned the anti-Israel dimension towards 
a more radical sentiment that regards Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin who live in Jordan as aliens and not 
citizens. This sentiment continued until a peace treaty 
between Jordan and Israel was signed in 1994; declaring 
the normalization of the official relationships between the 
two states.
The wave of Jordanian nationalism which followed 
the peace treaty did not pursue a similar track like what 
it used to be before the era of official normalization of 
the relationships with Israel. This  new wave introduced 
a discourse that combines resentment of any attempt of 
normalization of the relationships with Israel with an 
expressing the public disappointment because of the 
failure in finding a fair and permanent solution to the 
problem of Palestinian refugees in Jordan (Al-Azza & 
Al-Orzza, 2015, p.viii). This failure has been exploited 
in Jordan to justify any attempt to achieve a concrete 
progress towards political reform. Here, the local 
peaceful, and in few times violent, opposition to reform 
calls by political parties and movements is constantly 
justified in terms of standing against alleged foreign 
schemes which aim at dividing Jordan and entangle it into 
chaos. In this regards, the topoi of threat and conspiracy 
became essential components of the discourse of radical 
and conservative nationalism. Few anti-radical-reform 
wings in the regime have criticized in their discourse the 
accelerated pace towards reform under the assumption 
that this will trigger, or revive, profound, prolonged, and 
multifaceted social splits on the national level (Barari, 
2013). Some politicians were overt about how bad things 
will be if constitutional monarchy, for instance, and 
electing parliamentary governments (in its western form) 
are promptly reinforced in Jordan. Additionally, pro-
regime writers have echoed this argument by stressing 
the need to give democracy some (longer) time until the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is solved and Palestinian refugees 
are back to their homeland in Palestine. Accordingly, it 
becomes conventional to Jordanian nationalists to heavily 
rely on foregrounding the edge-of-crisis premises in their 
radical discourse. This argument accentuates that the 
Jordanian state is the target of existential threat due to 
political and economic challenges. The former is related 
to protecting the Jordanian identity and state against 
foreign schemes and plotting, and the latter ones are 
attributed to the government failure to find sustainable 
solutions and alternatives to the shortage of strategic 
economic resources. This failure is mostly manifested 
by periodical increase of fuel and electricity prices, high 
unemployment, depleted foreign reserves, increase in 
the national debt, and corruption. In addition, Jordan 
nationalists constantly warn against Jordan’s engagement 
in any regional conflict. These edge-of-crisis premises 
provided the radical and conservative nationalists 
with a strong justification to lessen the expectations of 
achieving concrete reform or even in fighting corruption. 
Thus, the state’s main priority, according, to them, is 
the fortification of the internal front and maintaining the 
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social peace and stability against the backdrop of regional 
commotion in neighboring countries. Interestingly, at 
any attempt to change the status quo, the slogan “ne3mat 
al’amn wal ‘amaan” (“the grace of security and safety”) 
is raised in juxtaposition with the situation in the “Arab 
Spring” countries which fall victims to various forms 
of catastrophic and apocalyptic civil strife because they 
demanded freedom and social justice.
The threat and conspiracy topos also expediently 
lends itself well to conspiracy and suspicious agenda. 
Conservative nationalism goes in-line with the state’s 
official propaganda when portraying Jordan as a HiSn 
(“fortress”) that stands against the chaos induced by 
foreign plotting and conspiracies. These conspiracies took 
the form of instigating domestic conflicts, rather than 
military aggression, by international and social media, 
rumors, radicalist terrorist discourse, and in many cases, 
the naivety and lack of professionalism of the state’s 
propaganda. In this regard, the “Arab Spring” is perceived 
as merely civil strives and sectarian wars which are 
the result of some Western (predominantly American)–
Zionist conspiracy that aims to the breakdown of Arab 
states. The perceived conspiracy is put in plain words that 
Sunni Islamist and Jihadist groups and the Iran-backed 
militant Shiite groups are instruments in instigating and 
perpetrating these internal conflicts; thus Jordan should 
never be an arena for their activities in any sort. This 
conspiracy discourse was remarkably helpful, to some 
extent, in arousing the awareness of Jordanian citizens of 
the overwhelming chaos across the region and which may 
reach Jordan. Thus, radical instrumental measures are 
tolerated and deemed essential to suppress any appearing 
tendency towards chaos.
2.   A DISCOURSE APPROACH ON 
NATIONAL IDENTITY
My argument here is that the “right-wing” genre would 
constitute an enduring discourse where army veteran 
as opinion-leading, or decision-making, figures in a 
long-lasting debate have drawn on the authority and 
legitimacy dynamics of their social contexts to discourage 
the sentiment towards the complete assimilation of the 
several components of society into one integrated, and not 
conflicting, mass. Such discourse aims to strengthen the 
opinion-leading figures’ authority, legitimacy, and legacy 
and weakening that of opposing parties by foregrounding, 
for instance, the sorts of the foreseen threats, plotting, 
and conspiracies which can threaten the unstable 
balance of society, as they argue, and under the flag of 
the opinion-leaders’, and opinion-makers’, ideological 
beliefs. To highlight the implications of the NCRAV 
radical and conservative “right-wing” discourse, I take a 
discourse–historical approach that attempts “to integrate 
systematically all available background information in 
the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a 
spoken or written text” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). My aim 
specifically is to show how the language of the NCRAV 
functions to achieve the ultimate goal of incitement to 
establish and protect the distinctive Jordanian national 
identity, and how it has been attuned generically over 
the last five years. Although the major themes of the 
NCRAV texts have not changed; still, there are few 
generic features which undergone some change over time 
as stated by the NCRAV. In their statements, the NCRAV 
follows a stretched-over-time mainstream that has 
constantly promoted the peculiarity and distinctiveness 
of the Jordanian identity. To situate NCRAV continuous 
reference to Jordanian identity in its macro-historical 
context, I first identify the generic features of “national 
identity” texts from the prescriptive stance of the NCRAV 
as opinion-leaders in Jordan. 
As the NCRAV is a proponent of the argument of 
the distinctive Jordanian national identity, its discourse 
of identity is structured in terms of opaque as well 
as transparent structural relationships of influence 
as manifested in its language. This language aims to 
express, constitutes, and most importantly, legitimizes 
their predisposal to the separation between the Jordanian 
identity and the other national identities; especially, 
the Palestinian one. Herein, the theoretical basis of my 
analysis regarding the nature of legitimation is based 
on works from the linguistic fields of social and critical 
analysis of discourse; especially those of Teun Van 
Dijk (1997), Martin Rojo and Van Dijk (1997), Van 
Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Van Leeuwen (2007, 
2008) among others. For instance, Van Dijk (1997, 
p.256) emphasizes that legitimation is associated with 
the speech act of defending oneself. This, in turn, is 
attained by the speaker’s highlighting of “appropriateness 
conditions” by providing sound and reasonable grounds 
or even acceptable motivations for the action either 
before or after its achievement especially if the action 
is controversial at the time being and has been or could 
be criticized by others. Here, Martin-Rojo and Van Dijk 
regard legitimation as “attributing acceptability to social 
actors, actions and social relations within the normative 
order” (Martin-Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997, p.560). And they 
add that this act of attributing takes place in contexts of 
“controversial actions, accusations, doubts, critique or 
conflict over groups relations, domination and leadership” 
(Ibid.). In this regard, the critical analysis of the NCRAV 
discourses is meant to reveal the relations between notions 
such as discourse, discursive practices, and legitimation 
strategies in order to recognize the linguistic realization 
of the embedded social constructions manifested through 
the ideology of the discourse(s) as they are understood 
in the text. Accordingly, the current research greatly 
relies on the basic assumptions of frameworks of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) in order to show how the 
NCRAV constructs social reality and shape public opinion 
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to legitimize their persistent incline towards defining and 
ascertaining a distinctive Jordanian national identity. 
In the case of Jordanian national identity and the stance 
of the NCRAV, legitimatization is provoked by the later 
to justify their call for achieving the comprehensive peace 
between the Arabs and Israel but not at the expense of a 
justified and permanent solution to the Palestinians’ rights 
in their homeland. Such legitimization has two-folds: top-
top and top-down. In the first instance, the opinion-maker 
party, represented by the NCRAV, legitimates its actions 
to its equal partners like political parties and public media, 
and in the second, which is more important to the scope 
of this article, is downward. Here, the opinion-leader, 
again represented by the NCRAV, legitimates its actions 
downward to the ordinary Jordanian citizen, and may be 
to the Palestinian as well,  by “using norms and values 
that are ostensible in the specific culture” (Van Dijk, 1997, 
p.255). In such a situation, the NCRAV was walking the 
tightrope in order to obtain the support of the Jordanian 
public on the one hand and that of the decision-makers on 
the higher levels of the state on the other. In both cases, 
the NCRAV stance should be consistently compatible 
with the cultural and traditional norms and values of the 
two parties. Meanwhile, the NCRAV benefits from their 
self-image of the army as a typical institution of a modern 
state whose noble task is of defending the nation and the 
state from its enemies, and that the army is also the school 
for the fostering of national feeling and patriotic education 
that boost the one’s own esteem of national identity.
To situate the NCRAV’s position of the Jordanian 
national identity in its macro-historical context, I here 
identify with the analysis below the generic features of 
the discourse of national identity. My main concern is 
oriented towards the most perennial aspects this discourse 
as reflected in our texts, involves: (i) legitimizing through 
foregrounding the soundness of the NCRAV; (ii) an appeal 
to the political and historical importance of the context 
where NCRAV situated their discourse of Jordanian 
national identity; (iii) the construction of the image of 
the existential threat to Jordanian national identity; and 
(iv) an appeal for unification behind the NCRAV as a 
legitimate watch-dog movement to those plots which 
threaten the national identity. Accordingly, the NCRAV 
stance towards defining and ascertaining a distinctive 
Jordanian identity is discursively prompted by means of 
several legitimization strategies. The most perennial of 
these involve four legitimatization strategies based on the 
work of Van Leeuwen (2007), and this involves: (a) an 
appeal that is based on the authority of the NCRAV; (b) 
an appeal to the moral evaluation of having a distinctive 
national identity; (c) Mythopoesis which involves the 
legitimatization of the separation of Jordanian identity 
from other ones and as conveyed through different social 
and political topoi, or motifs, whose outcome praise the 
legitimate actions and disparage the non-legitimate ones; 
and finally (d) Rationalisation that involves legitimization 
“by reference to the goals, the uses and the effects of 
institutionalized social action” (Ibid.). I elaborate the last 
two strategies by adding a fifth strategy that constitutes 
the emergence of a set of appeals which based on the 
constructive values of Jordanian national identity (such as 
history, destiny, and common good among others). 
As with all the 29 texts I examined, they all represent 
several attempts at an extreme hortatory goal with the 
ultimate goal is to get people to support the argument of the 
NCRAV and their stance towards defining and ascertaining 
a distinctive Jordanian identity for the benefit of all 
people of Jordan and Palestine. Here, I identify how the 
strategies presented above appear in these texts in generic 
and historically outline. The main aim of such outline is to 
show how these strategies function with the help of other 
linguistic means to achieve the NCRAV’s aim of persuasion.
3.  DATA AND ANALYSIS
The basic assumption of the research problem is that the 
discourse of the NCRAV on Jordanian national identity 
hides or expresses its ideological and attitudinal positions 
in subtle and mild forms (Van Dijk, 1995). Herein, my 
general objective is to investigate the discursive themes, 
linguistic structures and legitimization strategies of the 
NCRAV on defining, distinguishing, and ascertaining 
a distinctive Jordanian national identity to arrive at 
NCRAV’s ideological and attitudinal positions and its 
consequent contribution to the sustainable social stability 
in Jordan, and to guarantee the return of the Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan to their homeland. The research 
questions are formed to mark out the appropriate answers 
for the two general questions 
●	 	How	 does	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	 NCRAV	 on	
national identity discursively construct socio-
political understanding, reality, and expectation 
of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples to their 
distinctive identities?
●	 	What	discursive	practices	used	by	 the	NCRAV	
in order to construct the meaning of Jordanian 
national identity?
In this regard, the discourse under investigation is 
that of the NCRAV. It is compiled from all their public 
statements, addresses, declarations, and announcements 
which have been published on the electronic journal 
Ammonnews  (www.ammnnews.net).  The Website 
involves an accessible archive which involves up-to-date 
collections of the NCRAV activities their first statement 
in May 2010. Thus, the corpus includes the texts covering 
the period between May 2010 and December 2015. These 
texts have been first collected and then transformed into a 
machine-readable form (Rich Text Format*.rtf); this helps 
making them ready for the corpus analytical procedures. 
As a result, a small corpus consists of 29 texts (making 
about 10,000 words) was compiled from all these texts 
and they are distributed as follows (Table 1):
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Table 1
The Size of the NCRAV Corpus
Number of wordsDate of the statementStatement No.
88301/05/20101
23108/07/20102
49917/07/20103
36403/08/20104
42908/09/20105
44219/09/20106
51209/11/20107
74811/02/20118
24605/03/20119
25418/10/201110
17606/12/201111
24009/01/201212
20017/01/201213
25319/01/201214
40921/01/201215
60109/02/201216
11613/02/201217
27213/03/201218
24022/10/201219
41911/11/201220
23625/08/201321
38331/08/201322
14427/02/201423
22123/06/201424
28415/09/201425
32117/06/201526
22115/07/201527
34114/09/201528
32107/12/201529
10006 wordsTotal29
The initial quantitative corpus-based analysis involves 
using WordSmith 5.0 Tools to identify the contexts in 
which the keyword “identity” (in Arabic “huweya”) 
appears. Although, the software interface of WordSmith 
5.0 Tools allows the search for exact words (e.g. 
“identity”) or phrases (e.g. Jordanian identity (“alhuweya 
al”urduneyah”)), lemmas (e.g. protect (“yaHmy”), 
protects (“yaHmy”), protected (“maHmy”), protection 
(“Hemaya”), parts of speech or any combination of those 
in English, the research tools does not perform such tasks 
efficiently when dealing with a non-unicode orthographic 
systems as that of Arabic. For this reason, I relied on my 
qualitative analysis on Nvivo 10 which can handle the 
Arabic text satisfactorily. Herein, Nvivo 10 allowed the 
search for surrounding words (collocates) within a 4-word 
pre or post the keyword under investigation. The qualitative 
analysis of all instances where the keywords contextually 
related to the theme “national identity” (i.e. lemmas and 
collocations) in the corpus is conducted using Nvivo 10. 
4.  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
In Arabic, the term huweyah (identity) is derived from the 
masculine singular personal pronoun huwa (he). The word 
huweya then is a composite of a repeation of the pronoun 
huwa and the attributive suffix –ya (See Almacaani Arabic 
Dictionary Online: “huweyah”). The connotation of the 
term huweyah involves the meaning of “unification with 
self”. The word identity is used to describe the concept of 
a person and the expression of his individuality and his 
relationship with groups. In relation to nationalism and 
affiliation, the identity is consistent with the requirements 
of some legal and political affiliation and thought, such 
as the law of citizenship for instance. This sort of identity 
is based on substantial and conceptual common grounds 
such as the geographic location, the historical memory, 
and the unified collective culture. In addition, it reflects 
what a citizenship can verily offer to the individual in 
terms of equality and rights. Thus, national identity is 
regarded as a collective product of a group of people that 
is resulted through their socialization, their shared system 
of beliefs (ideologies), their common values, and their 
established assumptions and expectations as they transmit 
between the members of this group (Smith, 1991, p.8). 
Generally, the group’s national symbols, its traditions, 
memories (especially those of national experiences) and 
its achievements are considered a materialisation of the 
collective elements of national identity. What is most 
crucial about these collective elements is that they are 
deeply rooted in the group’s (or the nation’s) history. This 
proposition entails that the people tend to incorporate 
national identity to their own individual personal identity 
on the basis of the level of their individual exposure to this 
history; especially through their in-group socialisation. 
Accordingly, the collective elements of national identity 
could constitute the most vital parts of the “individual’s 
definition of the self and how they view the world and 
their own place in it” (Kelman, 1997, p.171).
The diachronic analysis of the corpus of NCRAV’s 
discourse shows that between May 2010 and December 
2015, the NCRAV mentioned and discussed “national 
identity” 47 times in 24 out of their total 29 statements. 
This mentioning and discussing involves the reference to 
a set of fundamental themes which are intrinsically related 
to Jordanian national identity according to the NCRAV. 
One can perceive that these themes are discursively 
represented through keywords as: identity, agenda, 
naturalization, settlement, quotas, disengagement, and the 
alternative homeland. These keywords (and their relevant 
lemmas) are diachronically represented in the NCRAV 
corpus in relation to years in the following table:
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Table 2
A Diachronic Distribution of the National Identity Keywords in the NCRAV Corpus
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Total no. of statements 7 4 9 2 3 4 29
Keyword (and its lemmas)        
Identity 11 0 0 0 0 2 13
Agenda 5 1 2 0 0 3 11
Naturalization 3 0 3 0 0 0 6
Settlement 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Quotas 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
Disengagement 7 0 0 0 0 1 8
The alternative homeland 3 0 1 0 0 0 4
Total 34 1 6 0 0 6 47
The table above shows that the reference to national 
identity does not follow a systematic pattern through time; 
especially in the first year 2010 which shows a remarkable 
boom in referring to issue of “national identity” by the 
NCRAV when compared to the following years. This 
remarkable observation will be tackled and justified 
through the following discussion of the themes related to 
national identity as illustrated in the table above, and these 
are identity, agenda, naturalization, settlement, quotas, 
disengagement, and the alternative homeland. Table 3 
illustrates the frequencies of reference to these keywords 
(and lemmas) in the corpus and their collocations:
Table 3
The Frequencies of Reference to the National Identity Keywords (and Lemmas) and Their Most Frequent 
Collocations in the NCRAV Corpus
Keyword (and its lemmas) Frequency Collocations
huweyah (“identity”) 13 x Recognition of...., protect.... (5x), national, Jordanian, Palestinian, obliterate....(2x), predominate...., victim of....,  
adjenda (“agenda”) 11 x National, nation’s, Israeli, Zionist, special (2x), suspicious,  subservient governments
altajnis (“naturalization”) 6 x Campaign to..., Palestinian refugees, Palestinian citizens, plain pressures, Wadi Araba agreement (Israel–Jordan peace treaty), not-recognised
altawTeen (“settlement”) 1 x Zionist conspiracy supporters
almuHaSaSah (“quotas”) 4 x
Impose what is called..., demands of..., American and Zionist support, submission to 
pressure, alternative homeland, political rights, political bureaucratic offices, Israeli 
agendas
Fak al-’irTebaat  (“disengagement 
from the West Bank”) 8 x Enact, resolution, constitutionalise, a trust, protects,  honest sons, national identity
al-WaTan al-badeel (“the 
alternative homeland”) 4 x Leads to.... , goes to....., confront...., establishing.....
Total 47 x
4.1  Protecting the Identity
The NCRAV discourse takes the issue of national identity 
(“alhuweyah alWaTaneyah”) as the primary concern 
of its argument and stance. This discourse emphasizes 
the uniqueness of the Jordanian national identity and 
its distinctiveness from any other identity; namely the 
Palestinian. The NCRAV’s argument regards any attempt 
to assimilate the two identities into one as a threat to the 
two identities. Thus, we see that these statements are 
loaded with lexes related to the topoi of conspiracies and 
threats which collocate with the theme of identity such as 
recognition of, protect, national, Jordanian, Palestinian, 
obliterate, predominate, victim of. These collocations, 
among many others, occur in conjunction with the 
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keywords identity in the corpus as the following extracts 
illustrate (my translation from the original Arabic text):
1)  All categories of the Jordanian nation which 
have supported and interacted with the call of the 
veterans (NCRAV) and valued its outcomes for 
the sake of protecting the Jordanian national 
identity. (NCRAV’s Statement on  8.7.2010)
2)  Considering the Jordanian national identity as a 
distinctive - and chief - headline of the Jordanian 
state. (NCRAV’s Statement on 3.8.2010)
3)  Protecting the national identity of the striving 
Arab Palestinian nation. (NCRAV’s Statement on 
3.8.2010)
4)  Since the obliteration of this identity serves 
Zionism and its tools. (NCRAV’s Statement on 
3.8.2010)
5)  We will not allow anyone to predominate the 
Palestinian identity or bullying our brothers who 
are among us and in our hospitality. (NCRAV’s 
Statement on 3.8.2010 )
6)  The  implementa t ion  of  the  resolu t ion  of 
Disengagement from the West Bank which protects 
the two identities: the Jordanian, and its sister, the 
Palestinian. (NCRAV’s Statement on 8.9.2010)
7)  The Zionist agendas and its tools which lead to 
grave menaces whose victim are both the Jordanian 
and the Palestinian identities evenly. (NCRAV’s 
Statement on 19.9.2010 )
8)  It was a road map to a comprehensive and 
integrated reformative program that aims to protect 
Jordan, the nation and the identity, and to defend 
the leadership. (NCRAV’s Statement on 17.6.2015 )
A close look to the extracts above shows that the 
NCRAV echoes their own experience with warfare to fore-
ground the issue of defending and protecting (“yaHmy”) 
the national identity from a threat. The nature of this threat 
is mostly understood through its constant association with 
Zionism. This threat, according to NCRAV, is working on 
consolidating the current status of Jordan as a host country 
for the Palestinian refugees who are unable to return to 
their homeland. Thus, their own identity will no longer 
be associated with Palestine, but it will be assimilated 
to the host’s identity. However, as it is argued that the 
Palestinian component of the Jordanian population 
outnumbers that of (aborigine) east Jordanian citizen, 
then it is the Jordanian national identity that is under the 
risk of its assimilation and obliteration (“Tams”) (El-
Abed, 2014: 86). This issue is accentuated by the repeated 
reference to the Jordanian and the Palestinian identities 
as two distinct identities (“huweyatayn”) as in extract no. 
6 above. And that the status of the Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan is likened to nothing more than that of the guests 
(“Dayf”) and their host as in extracts No.5 and No.7. This 
discourse of guesthood significantly coincides with that 
of the separation between the two identities (See El-Abed, 
2014). Although the NCRAV lessens the weight of this 
controversial argument by regarding the two identities 
sisters (“shaqeeqah”) in extract No.6, and that both of 
them are victims (“DaHeyah”) of the same conspiracies 
and plotting in extract No.7, this stance was not welcomed 
by the public opinion as it may disturb the social peace 
in Jordan and raises a lot of concerns regarding to role of 
Jordan in protecting the holy sites in the West Bank.      
The NCRAV’s argument in the extracts above, and in 
most other places in their discourse, shows that they raise 
the issue of protecting the national identity to present 
themselves as the guardian of this identity. The topoi of 
the existential common threat and (Zionist) conspiracy 
consolidate their legitimacy despite their radical and 
conservative argument. The most remarkable aspect of 
this argument is the constant warning that the Jordanian 
state is under existential threat if the Jordanian identity is 
not protected by its separation from the Palestinian one. 
For this reason, the NCRAV appeals to the unification 
behind their conservative stance for the sake of protecting 
the state and maintain its strength. This position implies 
that having a strong Jordanian state guarantees defending 
the rights of Palestinian refugees in preserving their own 
identity and their return to their homeland.
4.2  The “Suspicious Agenda”
The word adjenda	 (pronounced	 /əˈdʒendə/in	Arabic	
and means “agenda”) is a term that is used to refer to 
the list of subjects that people will discuss at a meeting 
(Cambridge Dictionary). The term is broadly used in 
political language to refer to the issues and policies laid 
out by ideological or socio-political groups. In addition, 
it refers to the topics under discussion by a governmental 
executive, or a cabinet in government with the aim is to 
influence the public opinion about contemporary political 
news and debate. 
The term adjenda is predominantly used in Jordanian 
political language in a negative sense that implies the 
hidden motives of the groups which are shaped by their 
ideological orientation especially if the term collocates 
with the word “foreign” to make the compound “foreign 
agenda”. Herein, the coined depreciatory term is meant 
to underline the group’s benefits of external incorporeal 
and substantial support from foreign bodies to serve their 
invested “conspiratorial” plans.
In the NCRAV corpus, adjenda appears in 8 places 
collocating with two sorts of “referents”: positively 
evaluated and negatively evaluated. With the positively 
evaluated referents, the NCRAV targets those with 
“national” agenda who value their country and work 
on serving its best interests; thus we see that adjenda 
here collocates with the lexes national and nation’s. 
This category is contrasted to the second negatively 
evaluated referents whose agenda coincide and match 
that of the country’s adversaries. In this last case, the 
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keyword adjenda collocates with the negatively evaluated 
lexes Israeli, Zionist, special, suspicious, subservient 
governments. This dichotomy between the two types of 
referents which collocates with adjenda is illustrated in 
the following extracts from the corpus (my translation):
9)  To preserve the precious Palestinian soil and stop 
the Israeli agendas and those who are adopting 
them. (NCRAV”s Statement on 8.7.2010)
10)  Forming a nationalist cabinet of professional 
and honest figures who bear national agendas 
and defined program (NCRAV’s Statement on 
3.8.2010)
11)  A tailored and spurious parliament that executes 
the agendas of the subservient governments... 
(NCRAV”s Statement on 19.9.2010)
12)  The  inc iden ta l  a l l oca t ion  o f  advanced 
bureaucratic offices in the Jordanian state to 
some unheard of figures or to those who bear 
suspicious agendas. (NCRAV’s Statement on 
15.7.2015)
The extracts above demonstrate that the NCRAV 
uses the term adjenda to generically situate the different 
partakers of decision making circles in the Jordanian 
state and classify them according to their intentions. 
The NCRAV does not explicitly refer to the identity of 
those partakers even once they are positively evaluated. 
Instead, it generically accentuates their actions and 
deeds as depicted by the underlined verbs in the extracts 
above. The nature of these agendas and its implications 
are constantly fore-grounded by its association with 
the alleged foreign plans to designate Jordan as the 
alternative homeland for the Palestinian refugees; as in 
extract No.9. This position is emphasised by the repeated 
association between these hidden agendas and the Israeli 
practices against the Palestinians (extracts No.9 and 12) 
and its stubborn position towards peace process and its 
refusal of the return of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and 
all around the world to their homeland. These practices 
and measures are perceived as an existential threat to 
Jordan and its national identity as a host country with its 
own individual identity that should be separated from the 
Palestinian one. 
Accordingly, the NCRAV is marketing itself to the 
Jordanian public as the “guardian” of the country’s 
interests against its foreign adversaries’ agendas and those 
Jordanian groups who bear and adopt these agendas. 
This position strengthens the image of the NCRAV as 
a leading public figure whose authority and legitimacy 
depend on their ability to foreseen the threats which these 
hidden agendas bring against Jordan. Herein, the NCRAV 
emphasizes its role as a guardian of the Jordanian national 
identity against all the adjenda that aim to assimilate 
this identity into the Palestinian one. This image of the 
NCRAV as the “guardian of national identity” appeals 
for the necessity of the Jordanians, and Palestinian-origin 
Jordanians, unification behind the NCRAV as a legitimate 
“watch-dog” body against threatening the Jordanian and 
Palestinian identities.
4.3  Submission to Naturalization, Settlement, 
and Quotas
Naturalization is the act of making someone a legal 
citizen of a country that they were not born in (Cambridge 
Dictionary). While this process of naturalization is subject 
to laws and regulations. The subject of Naturalization 
(altajnis) occupies great portion of the NCRAV’s 
argument on the threat to Jordanian national identity. 
Although naturalization has targeted deferent groups of 
foreign-born settlers in Jordan who spent a significant 
portion of life in the country and invested in it (Nationality 
Law No.6 of Jordan (1954, 1987 Amendment) – 3: 
Naturalization), the NCRAV argues that naturalization 
in Jordan does not seem to follow definite formal 
parameters that plainly state how someone may qualify 
for naturalization. What is more, the NCRAV constantly 
accuses the government of using massive naturalization 
of Palestinian settlers as a substantial evidence of its 
submission to the foreign pressure that regards Jordan as 
the alternative homeland for Palestinian refugees in what 
is known as altawTeen  (“settlement”). 
The policies of altajnis and altawTeen in Jordan are 
deemed by the NCRAV, and few conservative political 
movements and parties, to lead to further submission 
to international and foreign pressure to give the newly-
naturalized citizens equal civil and political rights as 
those of the originally Jordanian citizens such as public 
education and health, the participation in the political 
life, and joining civil service and the army, and even 
occupying sovereign bureaucratic offices in the state. 
These last concerns are accentuated by the NCRAV as 
a real concern to the Jordanian national identity as it 
consolidates the alleged policy of quotas (almuHaSaSah) 
between the different components of the Jordanian 
society on the basis of their origin. Accordingly, the 
discourse of the NCRAV continually warns against 
these three practices and policies (altajnis, altawTeen, 
almuHaSaSah), and it considers them as a substantial 
threat to national identity and the sovereignty of the 
state. This can be plainly perceived in the corpus as the 
distribution of these keywords systematically collocates 
with a large number of lexes such as: campaign to..., 
Palestinian refugees, Palestinian citizens, plain pressures, 
Wadi Araba agreement (Israel–Jordan peace treaty), not-
recognised, Zionist conspiracy supporters, Impose what 
is called..., demands of..., American and Zionist support, 
submission to pressure, alternative homeland, political 
rights, political bureaucratic offices, Israeli agendas...etc. 
this large variation in the lexes can be illustrated in the 
extracts below:
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13)  … [they] launched a campaign against the 
Kingdom to naturalize  more Palestinian 
refugees. (NCRAV’s Statement on 1.5.2010)
14)  The Kingdom is under plain pressure to 
naturalize everyone and endowing them a 
quota in the political system that equals their 
percentage. (NCRAV’s Statement on 1.5.2010)
15)  …. and the Prime Minister is verily implementing 
Article (8) of Wadi Araba (Israel–Jordan peace 
treaty) which dictates the naturalization of all 
Palestinians in Jordan. (NCRAV’s Statement on 
9.1.2012)
16)  Just to point that the Committee (NCRAV) does 
not recognize any process of naturalization 
performed after 1988, and it considers these 
procedures invalid. (NCRAV’s Statement on 
9.1.2012)
17)  The Zionist conspiracy is most serious because 
it has inseminating supporters within our 
country and who are overtly calling for the 
implementation of settlement and quota system. 
Even more, these supporters are relying to reach 
their goals on the Americans and the Zionists. 
(NCRAV’s Statement on 1.5.2010)
18)  The Jordanian governmental policies reveal 
considerable leniency to the American pressure 
and the Zionist provocation and its local 
supporters. And it has verily started a quota 
system that leads to the alternative homeland 
for the political, administrative, and sovereignty 
levels. (NCRAV’s Statement on  1.5.2010)
The extracts above illustrate the NCRAV’s concern 
about the future of Jordanian national identity because of 
the internal and external “pressure” (DughoTat) which 
leads to the Jordanian choice as a solution to the problem 
of the Palestinian refugees. The NCRAV introduces in 
these extracts the topoi of foreign nations as a threat to the 
state, and it accentuates how the process of naturalizing 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan has characterized four 
parties: The Kingdom, the Palestinian refugees, foreign 
countries and groups and those Jordanians who support this 
practice, and the NCRAV. The first party, the Kingdom, 
is depicted as a victim of multifaceted conspiracies 
(mu’amaraat) which aim to deconstruct its identity for 
the new scheme of Jordan as the alternative homeland for 
all the Palestinians; this is plainly perceived in extracts 
No. 13, 14, and 18. On the other hand, the Palestinian 
refugees are represented neither positively nor negatively 
in this regard. The language of the NCRAV regards them 
as the party, who does not act but acted upon; thus, they 
share the victim topoi with that of the Kingdom; as in 
extract No.15. Foreign countries and groups and those 
Jordanians who support naturalizing more Palestinian 
refugees are negatively depicted as the conspirators 
against the state and its identity. Remarkably, the NCRAV 
here explicitly refers to the name of these conspirators 
(Americans, Israeli, and Zionists) making them the 
primary agentive force that endeavors to accelerate the 
pace of naturalization; and this is plainly perceived in 
extracts No.17 and 18. Such a position can be perceived as 
an antagonistic discourses that tries to associate one’s own 
stance and their opposition to others’ identities because 
of their sense of threat of exclusion (Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985). Meanwhile, the Jordanian governments are deemed 
passive against these conspiracies to the extent that they 
actually facilitate them by implementing an unannounced 
quota system (“almuHaSaSah”) to assimilate naturalized 
refugees in the country’s political life under the influence 
of foreign pressure, or conspiracies. However, the fourth 
party (the NCRAV) regards itself here as the only public 
and nationalist authority to stand against these conspiracies 
and they bestow themselves the power to recognize (or not 
recognize) this practice on behalf of Jordanian citizens; as 
it is perceived in extract No.16. 
Herein, the NCRAV’s discourse regarding altajnis 
(“naturalization”), altawTeen  (“settlement”), and 
almuHaSaSah (“quotas”) reflects their ideological stance 
that divides people into two categories: The conspirators 
against Jordanian identity and the Kingdom on the one 
hand, and the guardians and victims of those conspirators 
on the other. This them/us ideological stance legitimizes 
the argument of the NCRAV on the separation between 
the two identities: the Jordanian and the Palestinian. This 
argument is fore-grounded by the NCRAV on the basis 
of emphasizing the NCRAV’s topoi of the existential 
threat against the two identities and by showing their 
definite concern about the survival of both Jordanian, and 
Palestinian, national identities as two separate identities. 
4.4  To Put the Resolution Into Law 
One of the most raised issues in discourse of the NCRAV 
is their persistent demand of the execution and enactment 
of the Resolution and regulations (ta3leemat) of the 
Disengagement of all aspects of legal and administrative 
ties with the West Bank. This persistent demand triggered 
most of the public argument and debate because of its 
implications. The NCRAV’s stance and interpretation of 
the Resolution (and regulations) are that the occupied 
territories in Palestine and the people who live there are 
no longer affiliated to the Jordanian sovereignty.  This 
calls then for the obligation of redefining the relationship 
between the Jordanian state and the people who live 
in the occupied territories in terms of the separation 
between the two identities. In this regard, we see that the 
keyword (phrase) disengagement from the West Bank 
collocates in the corpus with the lexes: enact, resolution, 
constitutionalise, to put in law, a trust, protects, honest 
sons, national identity; all of which accentuate the 
argument of the separation between the Jordanian and 
Palestinian identities. This argument is elaborated in the 
discourse of the NCRAV in the following extracts:
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19)  The resolution of Disengagement from the 
West Bank in 1988, and that originally came 
as a response to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization’s request and the Arab Summit in 
1974, was a crucial and elaborate decision in the 
Jordanian political system. (NCRAV’s Statement 
on 1.5.2010) 
20)  We consider the resolution of Disengagement 
from the West Bank announced by Late King 
Hussein a trust in the souls of the honest sons of 
the two peoples, and the time comes to enact it 
and organize the relationship between the two 
peoples. (NCRAV’s Statement on 3.8.2010)
21)  And to return to the constitution of 1952 
and the implementation of the resolution of 
Disengagement from the West Bank which 
protects the two identities: the Jordanian, and its 
sister, the Palestinian. (NCRAV’s Statement on 
8.9.2010) 
The argument of the NCRAV’s demands as illustrated 
from the extracts above accentuates two positions: the first 
is the inevitability of the separation between the Jordanian 
and Palestinian national identities, and the soundness of 
the people who support this proposition. The first position 
is presented from the constant juxtaposition between the 
Jordanian and Palestinian as two identities (“huweyateen”) 
which distinguish two peoples (“sha3baeen”) tied with 
the bond of brotherhood (“shaqeeqa”); as this is evoked 
in extracts No.20 and 21. This crucial resolution was 
necessary to protect (“yaHmy”) the two vulnerable 
identities from foreign conspiracies which aim to 
assimilate them into one. The second position is presented 
by labeling those who support the NCRAV’s position as 
the honest sons (“alshurafaa’ men abnaa”) of the two 
peoples who inherited this trust (“manah”) from the Late 
King Hussein. 
Accordingly, the Resolution is employed here 
to ideologically categorize people in terms of their 
acceptance or rejection of it in terms of honesty versus 
conspiracy scheme on the one hand, and in term of 
loyalty versus disloyalty to the legacy of the late monarch. 
Herein, the NCRAV legitimizes here its stance towards the 
Resolution of the Disengagement through foregrounding 
the soundness as the party to be entrusted to pursue the 
legacy of the late King and his wishes and as the honest 
guardians of the Jordanian national identity and its status 
as a state of law and institutions. In addition, the reference 
to the Late King Hussein in this argumentative issue aims 
to appeal the historical memories of the Jordanian people 
about the legacy of their most beloved monarch.
4.5  We Are Not the Alternative Homeland 
The discourse of the NCRAV considers the alternative 
homeland  (“al-WaTan al-badeel”) scheme as an 
existential threat to the Jordanian scheme and identity. 
The Committee’s concern stems from the several practices 
and procedures on the ground which several governments 
implement in the last years. The NCRAV constantly refers 
to alleged foreign conspiracies and pressure which favor 
the Jordanian choice as the best solution to the problem of 
the Palestinian refugees (Barari, 2013). At this point, we 
see that the keyword (phrase) the alternative homeland 
collocates in the corpus with the lexes: leads to, goes 
to, confront, establishing. In this, one can notice how 
the discourse of the NCRAV repeatedly refers to these 
schemes and plans, and they associate them to different 
internal and external factors; the following extracts 
illustrate:
22)  The Kingdom is under material pressure to 
naturalize everyone and endowing them a 
quota in the political system that equals their 
percentage. And this will inevitably lead to the 
alternative homeland.  (NCRAV’s Statement on 
1.5.2010)
23)  The weakness in confronting the plans to the 
alternative homeland is attributed to the 
emergence and the consolidation of power 
centres and ruling families. (NCRAV’s Statement 
on 1.5.2010) 
24)  And agreeing with the Israeli scheme that is 
constantly announced by the leaders in Israel, that 
their final target is to establish the alternative 
homeland in Jordan. (NCRAV’s Statement on 
9.1.2012)  
The discourse of the NCRAV emphasizes that the 
“path” towards the alternative homeland is paved by 
foreign conspiracies and pressure. The metaphoric image 
of path implies the ideas of planning and persistence to 
achieve a desirable destination. The Committee elaborates 
the image by accusing the governments’ failure in 
confronting (“mujabaha”) the course of these conspiracies 
and plans; as in extract No.23. The Committee here relies 
on the conspiracy and common threat topoi to warn the 
Jordanian people of their future. The threat is intensified 
by assigning this scheme to Israel and Zionism; which 
are allegedly considered as a source of evil; as in extract 
No.24. This argument strengthens the position of the 
NCRAV and legitimizes its fundamentalist demand of 
the separation between the Jordanian and Palestinian 
identities since the alternative homeland scheme will 
inevitably obliterate the former’s national identity and 
the latter’s actual homeland. Herein, the NCRAV relies 
on the construction of the image of the existential threat 
to the Jordanian and Palestinian national identities, and it 
appeals for the two peoples’ unification behind them as a 
legitimate popular movement that takes the place of the 
weak (“Da3eef”), and implicitly conspiring, government 
in confronting  (“mujabaha”) the course of these 
conspiracies and plans.
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The data presented above reveals the NCRAV’s stance 
towards defining and ascertaining a distinctive Jordanian 
identity. This stance is discursively accentuated by relying 
on several legitimization strategies (See Van Leeuwen, 
2007). It is perceived, for instance, that the NCRAV tries 
to present itself an authority which dictates regulations, 
monitor the government’s actions and policies, and 
participates in decision making. Additionally, the NCRAV 
constantly relies on appealing to the moral evaluation of 
having a distinctive national identity that is separate from 
the Palestinian one for the primary sake of protecting 
the refugees’ own identity and right in their homeland. 
In many instances, the NCRAV legitimizes their radical 
stance of the separation of the Jordanian identity from the 
Palestinian through mythopoesis, or the different social 
and political topoi, or motifs, whose outcome praise the 
legitimate actions and disparage the non-legitimate ones. 
This is mostly perceived in their reliance on the threat 
and conspiracy topoi and their role as the guards of the 
national identity. Herein, the NCRAV establishes the 
Rationalisation of their radical conservative discourse by 
reference to their ultimate goals which are to protect the 
Jordanian, and Palestinian, national identities. All these 
legitimization strategies are reflected in the discourse 
of the NCRAV on the basis of their affiliation to the 
Jordanian society and state, and this allows them to appeal 
the common social constructive values of Jordanian and 
Palestinian national identities such as the shared history, 
the common destiny, and the common good. 
CONCLUSION
On 26 October 1994, Jordan took a bold step by being the 
second Arab country to endorse and sign a peace treaty 
with Israel. This locally unpopular event was advanced 
by Jordanian officials because a “comprehensive peace 
between Jordan, Israel and other Arab countries is 
Jordan’s ultimate goal” (Al-Majali, 1994). This treaty 
was not received enthusiastically in Jordan and the 
Arab world. Despite the long-standing sentiment and 
attitude of the time that peace process with Israel would 
be inevitable as the late King Hussein was consistent 
in “pursuit an informal, strategic peace with Israel” 
(Bar, 2006, p.1), the majority of Jordanian people 
and political parties and movements agree that Israel 
should be considered as a “Zionist enemy” and not as a 
sovereign state (Kikkawa, 2012, p.67). However, and as 
implicated from the agreement, both Jordan and Israel 
have made significant progress toward implementing 
mutual “normalized” economic and cultural relationships 
at the official level. Although these relationships have 
been materialized through cooperation projects, such as 
in tourism, agriculture, and civil aviation (Nahar & Abu 
Humaidan, 2013, p.67), the public sentiment towards 
the treaty remains skeptical and unenthusiastic as the 
bilateral relationship between the two peoples have never 
shown any significant progress on the socio-political, 
educational, or economic levels. For the majority of 
Jordanians, the normalization of relationships with Israel 
is recognized as a serious threat to the Jordanian state and 
its identity because it has not led to a fair and permanent 
solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.
In their public statements in the last five years, the 
NCRAV introduced a discourse that accentuates the 
severity of the Israeli measures, and its international 
support and back, on the Jordanian national identity. 
Despite the fact that these measures are carried out in the 
occupied territories, the implications of these measures 
are affecting Jordan equally. In Jordan, some voices 
articulated that facilitating altajnis (“naturalization”), 
altawTeen (“settlement”), and almuHaSaSah (“quotas”) 
of Palestinian refugees in Jordan may be considered 
as supportive measures to their strive and misery, 
the NCRAV decisively rejects these measures, and 
it introduces a radical conservative discourse that 
reflects their ideological stance, in this discourse, 
they radically divide people into two categories: the 
conspirators against Jordanian identity and the Kingdom 
on the one hand, and the guardians and victims of those 
conspirators on the other. What is more, the NCRAV 
elaborates their dichotomy by referring to the Resolution 
of Disengagement as a decisive factor (or an ordeal) 
to label people in their soundness and loyalty to the 
Jordanian state. Accepting legislating and implementing 
the regulations of the Disengagement or not accepting 
them would ideologically categorize people as honest or 
conspirators on the one hand, and as loyal or disloyal to 
the state and to the legacy of the Late King Hussein on 
the other. Herein, the NCRAV legitimizes their radical 
argument through foregrounding their soundness as 
the party to be entrusted to pursue this legacy and as 
the honest guardians of the Jordanian national identity. 
This self-defending speech act (Van Dijk, 1997, p.256) 
legitimizes the NCRAV ideology by reliance on providing 
sound and reasonable grounds or even acceptable 
motivations for their radical conservative discourse. 
Herein, the NCRAV highlights the “appropriateness 
conditions” despite that their discourse in the separation 
of the two identities is controversial at the time being 
and has been or could be criticized by others. Such 
legitimization strategy has worked on two levels: the top-
top and the top-down. In the first, the NCRAV perceives 
itself authoritative and legitimates its actions and radical 
conservative stance to its peers such as public media, 
political parties, or even civil and public institutions. This 
is mostly seen in its declaration that it “does not recognize 
any process of naturalization performed after 1988, and it 
considers these procedures invalid.” (NCRAV’s Statement 
on 9.1.2012). In the second top-down level, the NCRAV 
legitimates its actions to the ordinary Jordanian citizen, 
and the Palestinian refugees using norms and values that 
are ostensible and which take into consideration their 
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desires, wishes, and hopes such as welfare, equality, social 
justice, and the refugees’ return to the homeland.
It might be recognized intricate to determine to what 
extent the discourse of the NCRAV has been successful 
in realizing their rhetoric and radical conservative stance 
on national identity. In its discourse, the NCRAV shows 
a willingness to take drastic measures on the ground to 
protect Jordanian national identity if necessary. However, 
one can easily see the decline of the significance and 
reception of the NCRAV’s statements and discourse. For 
instance, one of the key opponents of the NCRAV radical 
stance was a former prime minister and also the former 
Director of Central Intelligence and of the National 
Committee for Human Rights who launched in May 2010 
a counter-manifesto signed by thousands of Jordanians of 
different spectra and origins calling for national unity and 
putting an end to the peace agreement with Israel (David, 
2010). What is more remarkable is that the governmental 
measures on the ground are still promoting and facilitating 
altajnis (“naturalization”), altawTeen (“settlement”), 
and almuHaSaSah (“quotas”) of the descendants of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan by giving them more civil 
rights. Additionally, the Jordanian public opinion is still 
bound to focus on their economic concerns in welfare, 
public services, and social justice rather than the “fruitless” 
debate on political issues.
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